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Albany’s Dysfunction Denies  
Due Process 
 
Eric Lane* and Laura Seago** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The coup that shut down the New York State Senate for 
over a month last summer brought the State Legislature’s 
dysfunction to the forefront of public consciousness.  As the 
public waited for the approval of several critical budget bills 
and action on a long list of substantive legislation, two 
members of the newly elected Democratic majority deserted to 
the Republican side and then switched back again to caucus 
with the Democrats, destabilizing the already listing New York 
ship of state and spreading disgust among their colleagues and 
the public at large.1  These events were, unfortunately, not 
anomalous.  The process by which laws are made in Albany has 
been in shambles for decades.  Newspapers throughout the 
state have long reported on and editorialized against this 
 
* Eric Lane is the Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public 
Law and Public Service, Hofstra University School of Law, and Senior Fellow 
at the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law. 
** Laura Seago is a Research Associate in the Democracy Program at 
the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law.  The authors would 
like to thank Lawrence Norden, Senior Counsel in the Democracy Program at 
the Brennan Center for Justice, for his invaluable substantive and editorial 
insight at every step of the process of writing this Article.  We are also 
indebted to Amanda Rolat, Legal Fellow in the Democracy Program at the 
Brennan Center for Justice, whose tremendous preliminary research helped 
shape our legal analysis; and Tracie Knapp, student at Hofstra University 
School of Law, for her assistance in getting this Article to the finish line. 
1. See generally Posting of Casey Seiler to Capitol Confidential, Krueger 
Serves up Double Dose of Frustration in Letter, 
http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/15683/liz-krueger-serves-up-
double-dose-of-frustration-in-letter/ (June 17, 2009, 12:25 EST).  See also 
Andrew J. Hawkins, Fallout Boy, THE CAPITOL, Sept. 29. 2009, at 1; SIENA 
RESEARCH INST., NY VOTERS ANGRY AT SENATE, VOW TO REMEMBER IN 2010 
(2009), available at 
http://www.siena.edu/uploadedFiles/Home/Parents_and_Community/Commu
nity_Page/SRI/SNY_Poll/09%20July%20SNY%20Poll%20Release%20--
%20FINAL.pdf. 
1
966 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
dysfunction.2  Over the last six years, this view has been 
empirically undergirded by the work of the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law, which has, since 
2004, issued three major reports covering a decade of 
legislative voting records, debate transcripts, and documents 
that form the basis for legislative history.3 
The first report, which assessed legislative records 
produced from 1997 to 2001, compared the Senate and 
Assembly’s legislative rules and standard practices to those of 
all ninety-seven legislative chambers in other states and 
concluded that New York’s was, by far, the most dysfunctional 
legislature in the nation.4  In the intervening years, New York 
has shown little improvement in the stranglehold of chamber 
leadership over the legislative process and the four resulting 
problems of unused committees, inadequate review of 
legislation, insufficient deliberation, and a lack of public access 
 
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Bring Democracy to State Legislature, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/opinions/2004/08/08/2004-08-
08_bring_democracy_to_state_leg.html; Editorial, Albany's Failures, PRESS & 
SUN-BULLETIN (Binghamton), July 20, 2004, at A4; Editorial, New York’s Fake 
Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at C13; Editorial, A Legislature in Denial, 
TIMES UNION (Albany), July 25, 2004, at B4; Editorial, New York’s Shame, 
BUFFALO NEWS, August 1, 2004, at H4; Editorial, The Trouble with Albany, 
NEWSDAY (New York), July 22, 2004, at A36; Editorial, To Fix a Broken System, 
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), July 25, 2004, at C2; Jay Gallagher, Editorial, 
State in a League of its Own for Dysfunctional Legislature, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 25, 
2004, at 7A; Editorial, Albany Emperors, PRESS & SUN-BULLETIN (Binghamton), 
July 25, 2004, at 14A; Editorial, Still Broken After All These Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A24. 
3. See JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS: AN EVALUATION AND BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (2004), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/1f4d5e4fa546eaa9cd_fxm6iyde5.pdf [hereinafter 2004 
REPORT]; LAWRENCE NORDEN, DAVID E. POZEN & BETHANY L. FOSTER, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: NEW 
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM 2006 UPDATE (2006), available at  
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_37893.pdf [hereinafter 
2006 REPORT]; ANDREW STENGEL, LAWRENCE NORDEN & LAURA SEAGO, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, STILL BROKEN: NEW 
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM 2008 UPDATE (2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/Still.Broken.pdf 
[hereinafter 2008 REPORT].  At the crux of all three of these reports is the 
problem of dominant leadership that stifles public and rank-and-file 
legislator participation in the lawmaking process. 
4. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3.  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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to the legislative process.5  On at least some measures of 
legislative legitimacy, matters have gotten worse.6 
Ironically, the Senate coup—by most accounts a cynical 
power grab by Senators eager for attention and a distraction 
from their legal troubles—did bear some fruit.  Drawing on the 
work of a bipartisan rules reform committee formed by the 
Senate Majority in January, the Senate changed its operating 
rules in July to impose term limits on chamber leadership, 
create procedures for members to force bills to the floor, and 
provide for greater public access to legislative records.7  Except 
for a new rule mandating increased transparency, the effect of 
which is as-yet unknown, these changes may have little impact 
on the due process claims made in this Article.  And while 
other more meaningful changes are being considered in the 
Senate, the chamber’s practices, as of this writing, bear little 
resemblance to functional lawmaking.  Similarly, the Assembly 
has not made any meaningful attempt to reform itself beyond a 
few minor rules changes enacted in the wake of the Brennan 
Center’s 2004 report.  While these changes included 
eliminating empty-seat voting in the full chamber, requiring 
open and regular meetings of the Rules Committee, and 
mandating oversight hearings, other elements of the 
dysfunctional legislative process—like the absence of 
requirements for committee reports or mark-ups and the 
Speaker’s control over which bills move to the floor–remained 
in place.8 
In short, the lawmaking practices of the New York State 
Legislature presently and historically violate what law 
professor and former-Chief Judge of the Oregon State Supreme 
Court Hans Linde calls ―legislative due process‖—the 
constitutional obligation of the legislature to enact laws 
through a legitimate legislative process.9  Linde draws this 
 
5. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.  
6. For example, the 2008 budget process was one of the most secretive in 
decades, turning back the clock on recent moves toward transparency.  See 
Danny Hakim, Albany’s Big 3 is Cut to One as Silver Flexes Might, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A1. 
7. See, e.g., G.O.P. Regains Control of New York State Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1. (discussing new term limits on leadership). 
8. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
9. See generally Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. 
REV. 197 (1976). 
3
968 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
doctrine from the due process clause of the Federal 
Constitution—which is reiterated, almost verbatim, in the New 
York State Constitution—under which he argues that 
government may not regulate the conduct of its citizens or tax 
or spend their monies without what he calls ―a legitimate law-
making process.‖10  Behind this doctrinal claim is a clear 
recognition of an often forgotten but foundational principle of 
the state and Federal Constitutions—process is as important 
as product.11  The intent of both the United States and New 
York Constitutions is to simultaneously protect the broad 
representation of multiple interests while assuring that no 
single interest can easily get its way.12  The goal, as Justice 
Louis Brandeis wrote, is ―not to promote efficiency, but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.‖13 
As Linde does not explicitly define governmental 
legitimacy beyond stating that it is derived from constitutional 
principles, one aim of this Article is to elucidate this definition.  
We explore the lawmaking process in New York State with an 
eye to its legitimacy, using the United States and New York 
State Constitutions, and perhaps more importantly, the values 
that have informed them throughout national and state 
history, as our standards of measurement.14  Our focus is 
systemic, not on individual pieces of legislation.  We do not 
argue that the validity of every law depends upon some set 
procedure, but rather that the shortfalls of New York’s 
lawmaking processes delegitimizes all of its products.  Our 
claim is that in the context of a legislature as dysfunctional as 
New York’s, every bill enacted violates legislative due process.  
There is a legitimate argument to be made that such violations 
are justiciable,15 but whether and how the courts could or 
should address this problem is another matter entirely.  The 
 
10. Id. at 239. 
11. ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE 
CONSTITUTION SAVED THE COUNTRY AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 77 (2007). 
12. Id. at 53. 
13. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
14. See generally LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11.  
15. In Linde’s estimation, ―to deny an injured party relief from an 
improperly made law means either that courts will tolerate violations of due 
process of law, or else that every breach of the prescribed process does not fall 
short of due process in the constitutional sense.‖  Linde, supra note 9, at 245. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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separation of powers concerns raised by judicial review of 
legislative procedures warrant such prudence that we can 
recommend only modest judicial remedies that leave the 
fundamental workings of the Legislature in the hands of that 
body.  The best approach to solving this problem is undoubtedly 
through the political and legislative processes.  Ultimately, it is 
up to the public to hold the Legislature accountable for 
infringing on their right to democratic representation. 
We begin by examining the lawmaking process in New 
York and contrasting it with the characteristics of a legitimate 
lawmaking process.  In this context, we define and apply 
Linde’s theory of due process of lawmaking to New York.  We 
then consider the conditions under which litigation might be 
brought under this doctrine in New York, and conclude with a 
discussion of the limitations of this approach and an 
exploration of the political approach to restoring legitimacy to 
the legislative process. 
 
II. The Characteristics of a Legitimate Law Making Process 
 
Legislative due process demands a legitimate law making 
process.  It is our first task, then, to define the characteristics 
of governmental legitimacy.16  The three legitimizing 
characteristics of democratic government are 1) 
representativeness, 2) accessibility, and 3) deliberativeness.17  
 
16. It is important to note that legitimacy is not synonymous with 
rationality.  While it is not unreasonable to expect legislators to base their 
policy decisions on ―knowledge of present conditions; the identification of a 
preferred future, or a goal; and a belief that the proposed action will 
contribute to achieving the desired goal,‖ this model of rationality is not a 
realistic standard for legislative legitimacy.  Id. at 223-24.  The courts have 
repeatedly held that laws are constitutional so long as ―any set of facts which 
can reasonably be conceived would sustain it.‖  Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 
F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  In other words, although a legislature’s 
failure to document the extent to which it has investigated a problem that a 
bill attempts to address and develop the best possible solution to that 
problem may be symptomatic of a greater lack of deliberativeness, the 
apparent lack of rationality in the lawmaking process alone is an insufficient 
basis for invalidating a law.  While Linde notes that in large part, many state 
legislatures and Congress live up to a higher standard of rationality, it is not 
within the court’s purview to ask if a law achieves its stated goal, only 
whether the goal is legitimate.  Id. at 212.   
17. See generally ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS (3d ed. 2009). 
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Representativeness is defined as access to the franchise, ballot 
access for candidates, and the obligation of legislators to 
represent constituent interests.18  Accessibility has two 
defining characteristics: first, ―the right of the people to 
petition their legislators for the redress of problems,‖ and 
second, ―the right of the people to know what their legislators 
are doing (and not doing) in the conduct of public business.‖19  
Finally, deliberativeness describes processes that ―slow 
legislative decisionmaking and distance it from the passions 
and immediacy of the prevailing desires of individual 
legislators and of various constituencies.‖20 
These characteristics are rooted in the United States 
Constitution and its derivative state constitutions, and have 
been underscored as these documents have evolved to their 
present state.  As the Framers of the Constitution surveyed the 
United States in 1787, eleven years after independence, one 
thing became abundantly clear: America was imploding, 
leaving a nation described later by John Quincy Adams as 
―groaning under the intolerable burden of . . . accumulated 
evils.‖21  As the historian Gordon Wood wrote, the Framers saw 
in America, ―mistrust, the breakdown of authority, the increase 
of debt, the depravity of manners, and the decline of virtue.‖22 
The problem was that Americans had proven not to be as 
virtuous as hoped for by Thomas Paine and other leaders of the 
revolution.  Their conduct, like people everywhere, was 
dominated by their own self-interest.  As George Washington 
wrote to John Jay, ―we have probably had too good an opinion 
of human nature in forming our confederation. . . .  We must 
take human nature as we find it.  Perfection falls not to the 
share of mortals.‖23  Alexander Hamilton put it more bluntly, 
―men love power. . . .  Give all the power to the many, they will 
oppress the few.  Give all power to the few, they will oppress 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 595. 
20. Id. at 541. 
21. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 393 (1998).  
22. Id. at 476.  
23. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786) 
available at 
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/constitution/1784/jay2.html. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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the many.‖24 
The problem for the Framers was to protect American 
freedom from American vice.  The solution was first 
representation, what Madison considered the ―pivot‖ of the new 
system.25  Through representation the nation’s multiple 
interests (originally as defined by the Framers and later 
expanded by amendments to include, for example, women and 
other racial and language minorities) could be heard.26  From 
this perspective, the Framers defined freedom as the ability to 
advocate for one’s interests to members of the legislature–
though not necessarily to have those interests realized.27  
Through the separation of political power among two 
legislative houses and among the separate branches of 
government, the Framers intended to make certain that no 
particular interest could dominate another and that Americans 
would suffer neither executive nor legislative tyranny of the 
majority.  Of this latter form of tyranny, Madison wrote, ―there 
is no maxim in my opinion which is more liable to be 
misapplied and which therefore more needs elucidation than 
the current one that interest of the majority is the political 
standard of right and wrong.‖28  In short, a reliance on public 
virtue was to be replaced by a ―policy of supplying by opposite 
and rival interests, the defect of better motives.‖29  Success 
would require compromise and consensus, reached through 
slow deliberation.  From these principles flowed a common 
form of elective government, characterized by representatives 
elected from districts of roughly equal population to a 
bicameral legislature,30 the ability of any legislator to introduce 
a bill, the requirement that all bills must be passed by both 
houses of the legislature and signed by the governor before 
becoming law, and a system of checks and balances that 
 
24. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 131-35 (1987). 
25. See LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11, at 56.  
26. Id. at 123. 
27. Id. at 124. 
28. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786).  See also 
LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11, at 52.  
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
30. This is true of the Federal Government and all state governments 
except Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature.  See, e.g., NEB. CONST. 
art. III, § 1. 
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includes executive veto power and courts with the ability to 
interpret the constitutionality of statutes.  New York’s state 
government has all of these structural characteristics, and on 
paper, it looks like a model of democratic government.  In 
practice, the situation in New York is very different. 
 
III. The New York State Legislature at Work 
 
In Congress and in most state legislatures, legislators and 
their staff study an issue before crafting and introducing 
legislation that is then subjected to the rigors of a committee 
process that includes public hearings, debate, and a public 
reading for amendments called a ―mark-up.‖  In most American 
legislatures, all bills reported to the floor are typically 
accompanied by committee reports that provide background on 
the issue addressed by the bill and show the committee’s work 
on the legislation and, where appropriate, fiscal analysis 
prepared by a qualified state employee.  Once legislation 
reaches the floor, it is allowed to age for a time period sufficient 
to allow members to review the legislation, and then it is 
subject to debate during which rank-and-file members 
substantively discuss and, if appropriate, amend the 
legislation.  Once a bill passes both houses, most legislatures 
subject it to a conference committee to reconcile differences in 
each chamber’s version before sending it to the governor.31 
In New York, almost none of these things occur.  This is 
largely attributable to New York’s history of a leadership-
dominated legislative process, which undercuts normal 
legislative procedures from the outset.32  A hollow committee 
process ensures that legislation with which the leadership does 
not agree will never gain momentum through early exploration; 
instead, leadership shapes and solicits support for legislation in 
closed-door party conferences.33  Legislators introduce an 
extraordinary volume of bills, many of which are ill-considered, 
 
31. This is not to say that there are not many exceptions to this general 
format.  Congress and other state legislatures do occasionally stray from 
these typical procedures, but these instances remain the exception.  In New 
York, deviation from the standard of legislative legitimacy is the rule. 
32. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.   
33. Id. at 25, 43.   
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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redundant, or both.34  Which bills comprise the fraction of 
introduced legislation that receives a committee vote is left 
largely up to chamber leadership.35  Committees, for their part, 
rarely substantively deliberate on bills and never read them for 
amendments, acting instead as a rubber stamp for those bills 
that have the support of chamber leadership and a bottleneck 
for those that do not.36  Closed-door majority-party conferences 
run by the leadership of each chamber replace committee 
deliberation; in these conferences, the fate of legislation is 
sealed outside of the public eye.37  By the time a bill reaches 
the floor of the full chamber for a vote, its passage is a foregone 
conclusion, and as a result, rank-and-file members have little 
interest in debating or even reading the legislation on which 
they must vote.  Members are further shut out of the process 
through the abuse of messages of necessity, a constitutional 
provision allowing the Governor to circumvent the regular 
aging and debate of bills for emergency legislation.  In practice, 
this provision has historically been used to circumvent regular 
review of non-emergency legislation that might not withstand 
even the limited deliberation that occurs during the course of 
New York’s regular legislative process.38  Bills that are not 
guaranteed to pass almost never make it to the floor. 
Dysfunction begins at the very first step of New York’s 
lawmaking process.  In 2008, the New York State Legislature 
broke a record by introducing more than 18,000 bills.39  Just 
1,634, or 9%, passed both chambers.40  By way of comparison, 
members of the United States Congress introduced fewer than 
11,000 bills and resolutions in the same year.41  In other state 
legislatures, the next-highest bill introduction rate was in New 
Jersey, with only one-third the number of bills introduced than 
in New York.42  Citing the likelihood that legislators introduce 
such a massive amount of legislation for the political benefits of 
 
34. Id. at 43, 51-52.  
35. Id. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 48, 71 n.185.  
39. Jenny Lee-Adrian, Most Bills Don’t Become a Law in NY, 
POUGHKEEPSIE J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. 
40. Id.  See also 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 25. 
41. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.  
42. Id.  
9
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staking a claim on an issue rather than out of a sincere effort to 
change the law, the Brennan Center’s 2004 report suggested 
that disproportionate resources were being devoted to 
legislation that was never meant to see the light of day.43  In 
this context, however, this statistic is less interesting as an 
example of New York’s rampant government inefficiency than 
it is as an indicator of the fact that bill introduction is the only 
point at which rank-and-file legislators are given the power to 
substantively weigh in on many issues.  As we will show 
throughout this section, utterly hollow committees, reliance on 
closed-door party conferences for the conduct of legislative 
business, the inability of members to move bills to the floor 
over the wishes of leadership, and floor votes that serve only to 
codify predetermined legislative outcomes, all strip rank-and-
file members of their ability to fully participate in lawmaking, 
and ultimately, to represent their constituents. 
Once bills are introduced and referred to committee, 
matters do not improve.  In Congress and in most state 
legislatures, committees are the engine of deliberation, the 
place where bills are considered, debated, and remade.  In New 
York, committees go largely unused.44  Committees rarely hold 
hearings to gather information on the legislation under their 
consideration; of the 152 pieces of major legislation enacted 
into law between 1997 and 2001, only one bill was the subject 
of a hearing devoted specifically to its consideration.45  While 
matters have improved somewhat in recent years, hearings 
continue to be broad and issue-based, and not focused on the 
specifics of the legislation at hand.46  Neither chamber of the 
New York State Legislature requires committees to read bills 
for amendments, and legislators attest that reading bills aloud 
before holding a committee vote—let alone discussing them in 
detail—is not common practice.47  Only one ―mark-up‖ in which 
committee members read through a bill line-by-line and 
 
43. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 38. 
44. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 24-25.  
45. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
46. See, e.g., Posting of Laura Seago to ReformNY: The Brennan Center 
Blog on New York, Progress on Committee Hearings?, 
http://reformny.blogspot.com/2009/04/progress-on-committee-hearings.html 
(Apr. 27, 2009, 18:16 EST). 
47. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10; 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 11-12; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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suggested changes to its sponsor has occurred in recent 
memory.48  The absence of background work on the issue 
addressed by a bill provides little fodder for debate, and as a 
result, dissent in committees is exceptionally rare; in 2006 and 
2007, more than 80% of committee votes on major legislation 
were unanimous.49  Committee reports, which are required by 
the Senate rules to accompany all legislation reported to the 
floor, reflect the anemic nature of the committee process, 
showing little more than a voting record.50  The Assembly does 
not require committees to report on matters referred to them at 
all.51  Similarly, the Assembly rules set no requirements for 
fiscal analyses to be attached to bills with budgetary impact,52 
and although the Senate rules do require fiscal analyses, the 
Senate Finance Committee, which is required by the chamber’s 
rules to maintain a file of ―all bills requiring fiscal notes and 
the notes appertaining thereto,‖ does not have fiscal notes on 
file for many recent bills with clear fiscal impact.53 
While bills reported to the floor by committees typically 
receive no more consideration than an up-or-down vote, many 
legitimate bills that do not have the blessing of chamber 
leadership are not even subject to this cursory consideration.54  
In the Assembly, the Ways and Means and Codes Committees 
have the authority to request bills outside of their jurisdiction 
and to then sit on them indefinitely, earning them the informal 
designation as the place ―where bills go to die.‖55  Assembly 
members only have the ability to force bills out of committee at 
the end of the second year of a legislative cycle,56 and until 
 
48. The only mark-up that has ever occurred to anyone’s knowledge was 
arranged by freshman Senator Daniel Squadron in April of 2009 in response 
to concerns that committees were not adequately deliberative.  Daniel L. 
Squadron, Senator Squadron Adopts Brennan Center Recommendations for 
Robust Committee Meeting, New York State Senate, 
http://www.nysenate.gov/print/20528 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).  Senator 
Squadron’s markup procedure largely followed the Brennan Center’s 
proposed model.  Id. 
49. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.  
50. Id. at 11. 
51. Id. at 17.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 18. 
54. Id. at 6. 
55. Id. at 14.  
56. 2008 N.Y. Assem. Rule IV § 5(b). 
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recently, Senators did not have this power at all.57 
Once bills are reported out of committee, they go to the 
floor calendar.  According to written procedure, bills are to age 
for three days and then, once they reach the ―third reading 
calendar,‖ they receive a vote.58  In practice, bills can face one 
of two wildly divergent fates based on the wishes of chamber 
leadership.  If a bill has leadership support, the Speaker or the 
Majority Leader can ask the Governor to issue a ―message of 
necessity,‖ a constitutional procedure intended for emergency 
measures that circumvents the normal three-day aging of bills 
and truncates debate.59 Tenuous relations between the 
Governor and the Legislature over the past several years have 
reduced the frequency of the abuse of messages of necessity, 
but in 2000, more than a third of the legislation passed that 
was included in the Brennan Center’s sample, was sped 
through at least one chamber using this method.60  Some of the 
worst examples of rushed legislation occurred at the end of the 
legislative session; in 2005, 2006, and 2007, both houses passed 
more than 30% of all major legislation during the final three 
days of session,61 and in 2009, the Assembly passed 202 bills, or 
16% of all passed legislation, during the final thirteen hours of 
session.62  With less than four minutes allotted to each bill, we 
can speculate with reasonable certainty that no debate 
occurred. 
The leadership typically only sends bills to the floor if they 
are guaranteed to pass; before the summer of 2009, not a single 
bill was voted down on the floor of either chamber in over a 
decade.63  During a dispute over a bill that was apparently on 
 
57. This was changed first by the January 2009 rules that allowed for 
motions to discharge and then by the July 2009 changes that established the 
―motion for committee consideration‖ by which a sponsor may compel a 
committee to place a bill on its agenda and a ―petition for consideration,‖ 
which, if signed by 3/5 of members elected to the chamber, allows a bill to 
circumvent the committee process entirely.  As of this writing, these rules 
have yet to be put to use.  2009 N.Y Sen. R. VII § 3(e); id. XI § 3. 
58. Id. VIII § 1. 
59. Id.  
60. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29. 
61. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. 
62. Press Release, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, Legislative 
Material in the Assembly on Monday, June 22 (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20090622h/. 
63. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.  Since the summer 2009 coup in 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
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the active list without a calendar number, as required by 
chamber rules, one frustrated Senator quipped, ―[i]t’s like 
professional wrestling, we give the number ahead of time 
because we know it’s going to pass?‖64  With the outcome of 
legislation a foregone conclusion, many legislators do not even 
bother to dissent.  In 2006, over 96% of major legislation in 
both chambers was passed with no substantive debate,65 and 
over 86% of major legislation passed both houses with no floor 
discussion at all.66  In 2007, only 11.7% of major bills received 
any ―no‖ votes in the Senate, and only 31.7% of those bills 
received any ―no‖ votes in the Assembly.67  In most cases, these 
bills only received one or two dissenting votes.68  In 2007, for 
example, less than 2% of major bills were opposed by at least 
one tenth of the Senate membership.69 
If a bill is opposed by chamber leadership or it does not 
have adequate support to pass, it is unlikely that it will receive 
a floor vote at all.  Legislative leaders determine the ―active 
list‖ of bills that receive floor consideration on the next 
legislative day.70  In the Assembly, there is no provision 
allowing rank-and-file legislators to move bills to the active list 
over the wishes of the rules committee, which is chaired by the 
Assembly Speaker.  Until recently, the Senate imposed a 
similar barrier on bills coming to the floor.71 
 
the New York State Senate, six bills have failed before the full chamber.  E-
mail from Andrew Stengel, Senior Adviser for Government Reform, New York 
State Senate Majority, to Laura Seago, Research Associate, Brennan Center 
for Justice (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:59 EST) (on file with the Brennan Center).  
64. N.Y. S. Debate on S.B. 5755, May 7, 2007, at 2514, lines 13-17. 
65. For the purposes of Brennan Center studies, we define ―substantive 
debate‖ as any floor debate that includes questioning or back-and-forth dialog 
on the substance of the bill (as opposed to speeches describing an individual’s 
intent to vote for or against the bill in general terms).  See, e.g., 2006 REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 46.  
66. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. 
67. Id. at 15. 
68. Id.  
69. Id. 
70. N.Y. Sen. R. VIII § 6.  
71. Rules reforms passed in July of 2009 allow members to move or 
petition for a bill to be placed on the third reading calendar, after which it 
must receive a vote.  As of this writing, these rules have not yet taken effect 
due to restrictions on the date after which such a motion is allowed.  Press 
Release, N.Y. State Senator David J. Valesky, Historic Senate Rules Reform, 
Sponsored by Senator Valesky, Passes Senate (July 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/historic-senate-rules-reform-
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To help them decide which bills should go to the floor and 
which should be permanently detained, chamber leadership 
replaces the normal machinations of the legislative process 
with secret party conferences where the chamber’s leader polls 
individual legislators and negotiates compromises, all outside 
of the public eye.72  In effect, and sometimes in actual practice, 
this process subverts the deliberative value of the committee 
process.  In 2008, for example, the Assembly majority deemed a 
proposal to establish congestion pricing ―so important that the 
[Democratic] conference substituted for a committee 
meeting.‖73  Following the closed-door conference, Speaker 
Sheldon Silver unilaterally decided to keep the legislation from 
coming to the floor for a vote.74  Majority party members 
argued that all members had the opportunity to voice their 
opinions by expressing them to the speaker individually or at 
the party conference,75 but any such activity occurred outside 
the formal legislative process and away from the public eye.  
Even when a majority of the chamber as a whole supports 
legislation on a particular issue, a vote may not occur because 
either the majority party conference or the leader decides to 
hold a bill back for political reasons.76 
After an appellate court challenged the right of legislatures 
to conduct public business in secret caucuses in 1981, the New 
York State Legislature changed the state’s Open Meetings Law 
to exempt political caucuses regardless of the subject matter of 
the discussion, including discussion of public business.77  
Although this runs counter to the legislation’s purpose clause,78 
 
sponsored-senator-valesky-passes-senate. 
72.  2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 43; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 
17, at 533. 
73.  Azi Paybarah, Congestion Drip: Is Sheldon Silver the Man to Blame, 
N.Y. OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.observer.com/2008/congestion-drip-sheldon-silver-man-
blame?page=0%2C0. 
74. Id.  
75. Id. 
76. Id.  
77. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 533-35. 
78. The legislative declaration reads: 
 
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society 
that the public business be performed in an open and public 
manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
2010] ALBANY’S DYSFUNCTION 979 
this legislation enables lawmakers to shroud virtually all 
public business in secrecy.  While rank-and-file members of 
both parties may, as some Assembly members asserted in 2008, 
have the opportunity to privately express their views to 
chamber leadership and may also rigorously debate bills 
behind closed doors, members are stripped of the opportunity 
to cast a public vote on even those matters whose consideration 
dominates a legislative session.79  The public is then unable to 
ascertain their elected representatives’ stances on these and 
other issues of importance. 
This obfuscation of legislative business extends beyond 
party conferences.  Unlike many other states, the New York 
State Legislature does not, as of this writing, provide meeting 
minutes, hearing and debate transcripts, committee voting 
records, or fiscal analyses to the public in an easily accessible 
online format.80  The limited resources that allow a member of 
the public to determine where a legislator stands on a bill are 
available through public records requests that often take weeks 
or months to process.81  Other materials critical to public 
understanding of where a bill stands, such as written 
committee meeting minutes, earlier versions of amended bills, 
or substantive reports setting forth a committee’s work on a 
bill, do not exist at all.82  In addition to restricting the public’s 
access to the legislative process, the absence of substantive 
documents showing the work of the legislature—likely 
resulting from the fact that little work worthy of documenting 
actually occurs—poses a challenge to courts tasked with 
 
and able to observe the performance of public officials and 
attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go 
into the making of public policy. 
 
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 2008).  
79. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 533-35. 
80. New Senate rules passed in July of 2009 indicate that this should 
change in at least one chamber, but the Senate has not yet digitized these 
records, and the Assembly has made no similar commitment.  See 2009 N.Y. 
Sen. R. XIV § (1)(a). 
81. This claim is based on the Brennan Center’s extensive experience in 
filing requests for legislative records under the State’s Freedom of 
Information Law.  See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; 2006 REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 45; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 32. 
82. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 9, 11; 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 10; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. 
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assessing legislative intent, as we discuss later in this Article. 
 
IV. New York and Governmental Legitimacy 
 
The previous section showed that New York’s legislative 
process is undoubtedly dysfunctional.  The task of this section 
is to show that it is also illegitimate.  As stated above, the three 
legitimizing characteristics of government are 
representativeness, accessibility, and deliberativeness.  New 
York fails on all three counts. 
 
A. Representativeness   
 
There are two key aspects of representativeness.  The first, 
―representativeness of the electorate,‖ concerns universal 
suffrage and is largely irrelevant to the present discussion.83  
The second, ―representative democracy‖—the ability to elect 
officials to fairly represent their constituents—can be further 
divided into the qualifications for office, elections to legislative 
office, and representative obligations of legislators.84  While 
representativeness vis-à-vis elections to legislative office faces 
serious threats from restrictive ballot access rules, a legislator-
controlled redistricting process, and retrograde campaign 
finance laws in New York, these issues are less germane to the 
present discussion than the legislators’ representative 
obligations.  We focus, then, on the extent to which elected 
legislators in New York are able to represent their constituents’ 
interests. 
The diminution of the role of rank-and-file legislators 
functions to undermine representativeness in several ways.  
First, by conducting debates and votes in private and failing to 
hold hearings or other forums where the public can weigh in on 
legislation, the legislature denies the public an important 
opportunity to determine where their elected representatives 
stand on an issue, in order to effectively advocate for their 
policy preferences.  This, of course, cannot be fully separated 
from the principle of accessibility, which we discuss below.  
Second, in denying members the opportunity to cast formal 
 
83. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 465. 
84. Id.   
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votes on matters before the legislature by replacing formal 
processes with party conferences, legislators on both sides of 
the aisle are stripped of the most basic representative duty of 
casting votes on behalf of their constituents. 
 
B. Accessibility   
 
 Accessibility includes ―the right of the people to petition 
the legislators for the redress of problems‖ and ―the right of the 
people to know what their legislators are doing (and not doing) 
in the conduct of public business.‖85  New York violates both 
rights.  As discussed above, the shroud of secrecy over 
legislative proceedings makes it nearly impossible for citizens 
to effectively petition their legislators for the redress of 
problems.  While New Yorkers have the right to petition their 
legislature, the efficacy of this process is undermined by the 
fact that average citizens have no way of knowing what 
legislative business their legislators are considering in closed-
door meetings and, on some occasions, may never have the 
benefit of a recorded vote or statement reflecting their 
legislators’ stances on some issues. 
Those documents that are available to the public are often 
not accessible until it is too late for their use as effective 
advocacy tools, and their lack of substance obscures the public’s 
view of the legislative process.  Even if committee reports are, 
in their paltry details, an accurate reflection of ―what their 
legislators are doing‖ in New York’s hollow committees, the fact 
that these committees have been replaced by secret meetings 
subject to neither the State’s Open Meetings Law nor its 
Freedom of Information Law means that the substance of what 
legislators are doing—or not doing—in the passage of laws 
remains hidden from view.  There are no meeting minutes or 
transcripts of any part of the legislative process other than 
floor debates, at which point, as discussed above, legislative 
outcomes are preordained. 
 
 
85. Id. at 595. 
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C. Deliberativeness 
 
The characteristic of lawmaking in which the New York 
State Legislature’s failure to conform to legislative due process 
is most clear is almost certainly deliberativeness, or ―those 
steps of the legislative process that slow legislative decision-
making and distance it from the passions and immediacy of the 
prevailing desires of individual legislators and of various 
constituencies.‖86  In other words, deliberativeness is legislative 
shorthand for the due diligence that the legislature must 
perform in order to pass laws that achieve their stated goals.  
In Congress and most legislatures, deliberativeness is achieved 
through committee hearings and debate, an amendment or 
―mark-up‖ process, and substantive floor debate. 
In New York, bills with the support of chamber leadership 
glide through both chambers, slowed by nothing more than 
rubber-stamp votes of approval by a committee and by the full 
chamber.  Committees rarely hold hearings and never ―mark-
up‖ legislation, and floor debate, when it occurs at all, is 
virtually always perfunctory.87  The use of the word ―slow‖ in 
the definition of deliberativeness included above should be, by 
itself, cause for concern in a state where bills are routinely 
rushed through final passage in less than five minutes and 
where, in some years, over a third of major legislation skips 
normal aging and debate.88 
 
V. Remedies 
 
In Due Process of Lawmaking, Professor Linde avoids 
suggesting a specific remedy, stating in general terms that a 
remedy is required.89  Of course, he is correct.  A claim without 
a remedy nonsuits a case.  Linde does suggest that any remedy 
that a court pursues should use the legislature’s own operating 
rules as the primary standard.90  Unfortunately, this would not 
solve the problem at the heart of New York’s legislative 
 
86. Id. at 677. 
87. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 45-47.  
88. See, e.g., id. at 16.  
89. Linde, supra note 9.  
90. Id.  
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dysfunction.  In New York, the legislature typically does follow 
the letter of its own operating rules.  The problem is that both 
chambers’ inadequately robust rules are permissive of the 
legislature’s ongoing dysfunction and the inaction of its rank-
and-file members.  With this in mind, we explore the prospects 
and pitfalls of a judicial remedy to the problem of New York’s 
legislative dysfunction. 
Asking a court to remedy New York’s dysfunctional 
legislative process or to strike down legislation enacted through 
this constitutionally-flawed process also asks a court to open a 
Pandora’s box of possible separation of power and judicial 
competency evils.91  Courts addressing challenges to New 
York’s lawmaking processes have—rightfully, in our view—
avoided such danger.  This general rule has been long 
established in New York jurisprudence: 
 
Within the Constitution the legislature is 
supreme, and when a law confessedly within the 
power of the legislature to make, comes down to 
the people, authenticated by the presiding 
officers of the respective houses, approved by the 
governor and certified and declared by the 
secretary of State to be the law of the State, no 
citizen, I think, in a private controversy, can call 
upon the courts to go behind the record thus 
made up and impeach the validity of the law, by 
showing that in its enactment some form or 
proceeding had not been properly followed or 
adopted by the legislature, the supreme law 
maker.92 
 
91. See generally Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, 
The Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary 
Review, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002).  
92. People v. Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 283-84 (1865) (Campbell, J., 
concurring).  See also Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of N.Y., 76 N.Y.S.2d 
499, 504 (App. Div. 1948) (stating ―[t]hat the legislature may have enacted 
the statute in question without legislative hearing or recorded debates we 
regard as of no consequence.  The statute on its face bears the mark of a 
legitimate purpose, viz.: to legislate for the health, safety and general welfare 
of children‖); Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (where the Plaintiff argued that the legislature did not conduct 
hearings on a law that prohibited the sale or importation of certain wild 
animal products; however, even assuming that Plaintiff’s contention was 
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Convincing the courts to reverse course on this approach is 
not, and should not be, an easy task.  Perhaps the best news is 
that neither New York nor federal courts have ever ruled, at 
least directly, against addressing such a question.  A recent 
New York case, however, Urban Justice Center v. Pataki, 
makes abundantly clear the judicial resistance any such 
challenge will meet.93 
Despite these high barriers and the dangers of such 
litigation, at the end of this section we suggest a somewhat 
circuitous path that a court attracted to the possibility of 
remedying New York’s complete legislative dysfunction and 
consequential constitutional harms might be able to follow, 
prospectively if it chooses, without intruding too far into 
legislative territory. 
Two New York Court of Appeals cases, King v. Cuomo,94 
and Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. Marino,95 provide guidance.  
Both are cases in which the Court of Appeals narrowed the 
meaning of the term ―internal‖ to allow it to opine against 
legislative practices that it considered undemocratic.96  Skelos 
v. Paterson97 also provides some hope.  Here, after weeks of 
very public and criticized legislative inaction, infighting, and 
failure to renew critical legislation before the close of the fiscal 
year, the New York State Court of Appeals determined, on 
what could be fairly considered thin law, that the Governor’s 
appointment of a Lieutenant Governor was constitutionally 
 
correct, the Court held that ―there is no constitutional requirement that the 
legislature conduct hearings and build a record when it passes a law‖); 
Heimbach v. State, 452 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983) (where plaintiffs commenced 
an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the roll call vote taken for a 
proposition was not correctly registered by the Clerk of the Senate and 
therefore not validly enacted, the court held that § 40 of the Legislative Law 
provides the presiding officer’s certificate showing the date and requisite 
votes for the passage of a bill is conclusive evidence that the bill was validly 
enacted and the court found this to ―[preclude] judicial review of the propriety 
of the subject roll call vote to effect legislative action,‖ and did not, out of 
―respect for the basic polity of separation of powers and the proper exercise of 
judicial restraint . . .  intrude into the wholly internal affairs of the 
legislature‖). 
93. 828 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div. 2006). 
94. 613 N.E 2d 950 (N.Y. 1993). 
95. 661 N.E.2d 1372 (N.Y. 1995). 
96. See Cuomo, 613 N.E.2d 950; Marino, 661 N.E.2d 1372.  
97. 915 N.E.2d 1141 (N.Y. 2009). 
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legitimate.98  The message we gather from that decision is that 
egregious facts matter.  As the Supreme Court of the United 
States noted only last year with respect to a matter that 
seemed to have no easy remedy: 
 
It is true that extreme cases often test the 
bounds of established legal principles, and 
sometimes no administrable standard may be 
available to address the perceived wrong.  But it 
is also true that extreme cases are more likely to 
cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s 
intervention and formulation of objective 
standards.  This is especially true when due 
process is violated.99 
 
While all of these cases provide guidance for a potential judicial 
remedy, any attempt at mapping such a strategy must begin 
with an exploration of Urban Justice Center, an appellate case 
demonstrating the many obstacles that will be encountered in 
planning a successful challenge. 
 
A. Urban Justice Center v. Pataki 
 
 In 2005, The Urban Justice Center, a nonprofit 
organization, along with Democratic Senator Liz Krueger and 
Republican Assemblyman Thomas J. Kirwin, each a member of 
their chamber’s minority party, brought a broad declaratory 
judgment action under the Equal Protection and Freedom of 
Speech provisions of both the United States and New York 
Constitutions,100 challenging the lawfulness of practices ―used 
by the majority party in each chamber to deny minority party 
members meaningful participation in the legislative process.‖101  
Most significant among these practices, particularly for a 
discussion of legislative due process, was the use of secret, 
unrecorded majority party conferences in each house for 
 
98. Id. at 1146.  
99. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). 
100. Urban Justice Center v. Pataki, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (App. Div. 
2006).  The plaintiffs also argued that the challenged practices violated 
certain New York statutes.  Id.  
101. Id. 
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conducting legislative debate and decision making.102  As 
discussed earlier, it is these inaccessible conferences and the 
atrophied committee system that form the basic element of the 
due process violation. 
Urban Justice Center alleged that these practices ―operate 
to exclude it and its clients from participating in the legislative 
process and fulfilling its mission‖ of advocating for indigents.103  
The legislator-plaintiffs argued that these anti-minority party 
practices diminished their capacity, as members of the 
minority in each house, to participate in the legislative 
process.104 
The legislator-plaintiffs also made several resource claims.  
They claimed that the majority leaders of each house denied 
minority party members equal access to various resources for 
their own legislative efforts (e.g., staff and postage) and for 
their districts (e.g., earmarked funds).105   
The court did not reach the merits of these claims, deciding 
either on the basis of standing or prudence that none were 
judicially cognizable.106  The equal protection approach 
provided cover for the court, allowing it to view the entire 
matter as an attempt by minority party members to seek 
judicial reinforcements for battles they could not win 
politically.  In its decision, the court wrote that ―the challenges 
to the holding of majority political party conferences are 
nothing less than an assault upon our party system of 
government, in which all the parties, not only the majority, try 
to coordinate political and legislative strategy, with greater or 
lesser effectiveness.‖107  By focusing on differential treatment 
between minority and majority party members, plaintiffs 
denied the court the broader and more accurate vision 
presented by the Brennan Center, that: 
 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 15. 
104. Id. at 14.  
105. Id. at 18.  Incidental to this case, but not to this Article, is the fact 
that leadership domination of the process (and membership acquiescence to 
this state of affairs) leads to discriminatory practices. 
106. Id. at 15.  
107. Id. at 20.  
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most legislators [regardless of party] are 
effectively shut out of the legislative process, 
particularly at the most significant stage, when 
the leadership determines which bills should be 
passed and in what form.  As a result, New 
Yorkers’ voices are not fully heard, and bills 
are not tested to ensure that they reflect the 
public’s views. 108 
 
B. Standing 
 
Standing in New York, as elsewhere in the country, 
requires a plaintiff to allege a ―personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief.‖109  On this basis, the Urban 
Justice Center’s allegations of diminished opportunities to 
participate in the political process as a result of majority party 
domination of each house, without an additional injury, was 
doomed from the start.  The court concluded that Urban Justice 
Center’s stated injury was ―too speculative to constitute the 
type of an injury-in-fact necessary to confer standing.‖110  The 
court went on to explain that: 
 
Urban Justice Center has failed to explain how 
defendants’ conduct has prevented it from 
advocating in the Legislature, with the 
legislative leaders, or with the legislative 
members of the majority party, or show that 
the majority party in either chamber is less 
favorably disposed toward its mission than the 
minority party.111 
 
Additionally, even if the Urban Justice Center had 
provided adequate evidence of the indubitable truth that the 
then-Republican majority in the Senate was ―less favorably 
 
108. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. 
109. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  See also MFY Legal 
Servs. v. Dudley, 67 N.Y.2d 706, 708 (1986).  
110. Urban, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 15. 
111. Id. 
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disposed‖ to Urban Justice Center’s mission than the 
democratic majority in the Assembly, such a complaint still 
most likely would not have satisfied standing requirements; 
later in its decision the court suggested that procedural claims 
such as those offered by Urban Justice Center are not 
justiciable.112 
The legislator-plaintiffs’ process claims are more 
immediate and specific.  Minority party members are 
unquestionably treated unequally, even in the context of New 
York’s lawmaking processes that marginalize almost all rank-
and-file legislators.  Here, however, the court focused on the 
redressability of the claims, not on their solidity.113  Citing the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Raines v. Byrd,114 the 
court determined that the legislator-plaintiffs’ process claims 
were ―a type of institutional injury (the diminution of 
legislative powers), which does not provide standing.‖115  The 
reference to Raines is important.  As we discuss below, it 
basically precludes a judicial challenge to the offending 
legislative processes by an individual legislator unless there is 
an actual concrete harm to a legislator’s power, such as that 
found in Silver v Pataki.116  In that case, the court determined 
that a member of the Assembly did have standing to challenge 
a gubernatorial line-item veto of non-appropriation bills which 
the member had supported, writing that, ―[a]s a Member of the 
Assembly who voted with the majority in favor of the budget 
legislation, plaintiff undoubtedly has suffered an injury in fact 
with respect to the alleged unconstitutional nullification of his 
vote sufficient to confer standing.‖117 
In Raines, a number of members of Congress who had 
voted against the 1997 Line-Item Veto Act118 brought suit 
challenging the statute’s constitutionality.119  Their alleged 
injuries were various increases in executive power, which they 
 
112. See id. at 18-24. 
113. Id. at 15-17. 
114. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  
115. Urban, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116. 96 N.Y.2d 532 (2001). 
117. Id. at 533.  
118. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 
2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West Supp. 1994)). 
119. 521 U.S. at 814.  
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argued unconstitutionally altered the balance of power between 
the legislative and executive branches of government.120  The 
Court determined that these claims were too abstract, but the 
focus of the decision was on a conjoined standing point, the 
justiciability of the substantive constitutional claim: 
 
We have also stressed that the alleged injury 
must be legally and judicially cognizable.  This 
requires, among other things, that the plaintiff 
have suffered ―an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is . . . concrete and 
particularized,‖ and that the dispute is 
―traditionally thought to be capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.‖121 
 
It is this same doctrinal reasoning that informs Silver v. 
Pataki, in which the New York Court of Appeals wrote, ―[a] 
plaintiff has standing to maintain an action upon alleging an 
injury in fact that falls within his or her zone of interest.‖122 
 
C. Political Issue Doctrine and Separation of Powers 
 
 After the court determined that the legislator-plaintiffs did 
not have standing to challenge the process claims, it was left to 
consider the resource claims.  The court judged (somewhat 
questionably in our view) that the legislator-plaintiffs did have 
standing to pursue those claims.  But this pursuit was short-
lived, given that the court immediately dismissed these claims 
as not judicially cognizable under New York’s separation of 
powers doctrine: 
 
The first three causes of action, contesting the 
unequal provision of office space, equipment, 
staff, and printing and mailing expenses, 
essentially challenge the Legislature’s allocation 
of institutional resources to its own members, a 
classic example of internal administrative 
 
120. Id. at 816. 
121. Id. at 819 (internal citation omitted). 
122. Silver v. Pataki, 96 N.Y.2d 532, 539 (2001). 
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prerogatives that are properly left to the 
Legislature to make, in furtherance of the duties 
particular to that body, without interference 
from the other two branches of government.123 
 
To make sure that other process challenges were 
discouraged, the court folded the process claims, which it had 
dismissed for lack of standing, into its separation of power 
jurisprudence, suggesting that even if there were standing in 
the form of a concrete injury to the legislator-plaintiffs, the 
claims would not have been cognizable.124 
As a general matter, it is hard to quarrel with this 
reasoning.  There is something constitutionally and 
democratically offensive about a court, unelected or elected, 
entering the lawmaking process and directing the legislature to 
follow certain procedures.  But despite this aversion to 
constitutional intrusion, the New York courts have not always 
stayed their hands.  King v. Cuomo125 and Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity v. Marino,126 two cases exploring the Presentment 
Clause of Article IV, §7127 are prime examples of such forays 
into the legislative process in which deference to legislative 
determinations on the meaning of their own constitutionally 
established procedures would have been entirely consistent 
with state precedent and a reasonable interpretation of the 
constitution.  In fact, although the Court of Appeals deemed 
the legislative practices in question unconstitutional in both 
cases, the intermediary appellate courts determined that the 
issues were not legally cognizable and left constitutionality to 
legislative discretion.128 
In King, a plaintiff argued that legislation recalled from 
the Governor by a joint resolution of the Legislature and then 
returned to the Legislature by the Governor should be deemed 
enacted because the recall procedure was unconstitutional, and 
thus the bill had aged beyond ten days so that it had become 
 
123. Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12, 28 (App. Div. 2006). 
124. See id. at 17-20.  
125. 81 N.Y.2d 247 (1993). 
126. 87 N.Y.2d 235 (1995). 
127. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
128. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 625 N.Y.S.2d 331 
(App. Div. 1995); King v. Cuomo, 584 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1992). 
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law ―in like manner as if he had signed it.‖129  The court agreed 
that the practice was unconstitutional for two reasons.  First, it 
was not enumerated in the Constitution, and second, it 
undermined the ―integrity of the law making processes as well 
as the underlying rationale for the demarcation of authority 
and power in this process.‖130  Very relevant to any proposed 
due process jurisprudence was the court’s second rationale: to 
ensure ―that the central law-making function remains reliable, 
consistent and exposed to civic scrutiny and involvement.‖131  
Another important piece of this decision for future litigation is 
the court’s willingness to apply it prospectively only: 
―Prospective application of a new constitutional rule is not 
uncommon where it would have a ―broad, unsettling effect.‖132 
In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, the constitutional provision 
is the same but the question is different.  Here, the Majority 
Leader of the Senate, the house in which the legislation in 
question was first passed, refused to present it to the Governor 
after it was passed by the Assembly.133  The question asked by 
plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the legislation, was whether this 
failure to present was consistent with the New York 
Constitution’s Presentment Clause.134  The Court of Appeals 
answered no, writing that ―[t]o hold otherwise would be to 
sanction a practice where one house or one or two persons, as 
leaders of the Legislature, could nullify the express vote and 
the will of the People’s representatives.‖135  This is exactly the 
condition that leads to our legislative due process claim. 
Urban Justice, the many cases cited therein, King, and 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity must frame any overall procedural 
challenge to New York’s dysfunctional legislative process.  
From Urban Justice, we know that it would be extremely 
difficult for legislators to bring such a claim in their elected 
capacity because of the legitimate standing and separation of 
power questions that would ensue.  We also know that a broad 
 
129. 81 N.Y.2d at 250, 252. 
130. Id. at 255. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 256.  
133. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 87 N.Y.2d 235, 237 
(1995). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 238-39.  
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categorical challenge to New York’s legislative processes by any 
plaintiff would likely fail for the same reasons.  Most likely, 
courts would determine that such claims are within the 
legislative domain and outside of their reach.  But from King 
and Campaign for Fiscal Equity we learn that the Court of 
Appeals, with the proper plaintiffs and claims, has been willing 
to vindicate the broad rights of New Yorkers to a 
representative, accessible, and deliberative democratic 
government.  How else can we read the court’s expressed 
concerns about the ―civic scrutiny and involvement‖136 (King) 
and ―express vote and the will of the People’s 
representatives‖137 (Campaign for Fiscal Equity)?  What is 
needed to fruitfully channel the court’s constitutional idealism 
is both a solid judicial platform from which the court can view 
the extraordinary damage resulting from New York’s profound 
legislative dysfunction and a reasonable remedy that 
ameliorates the injury without overstepping the boundaries 
implied by the separation of powers doctrine. 
Given the limitations discussed above, two approaches 
would seem to fit the bill.  The first, more modest approach, 
follows from the everyday problem experienced by the New 
York Court of Appeals of how to read unclear statutes adopted 
through a legislative process that never leaves a record of its 
intent.  Our proposal is that the court should adopt a canon of 
construction that all statutes be interpreted narrowly unless 
actual legislative history indicates to the contrary.  The second, 
more radical proposal emanates from the fact that all 
legislative deliberation currently occurs in closed and 
unrecorded majority-party political conferences.  Here, our 
proposal is that the court should declare unconstitutional the 
provision of the Open Meetings law that allows for the 
discussion of public business in the privacy of legislative 
political conferences. 
 
 
136. King v. Cuomo, 81 N.Y.2d 247, 247 (1993). 
137. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 625 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. 
Div. 1995). 
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D. Unclear Statutes to be Read Narrowly 
 
 Our first suggestion is for the court to read each statute 
extremely narrowly unless its legislative history evidences an 
intent that it be read broadly.  Every case of statutory 
interpretation involves the question of whether a statute 
should read more broadly, covering more individuals, groups, 
or actions; or more narrowly.  The court should continuously 
remind legislators and the public in its decisions that such an 
outcome could be avoided if the legislature would establish a 
legislative record documenting meaningful legislative 
procedures.  By defaulting to a narrow mode of interpretation, 
the court signals to the Legislature that if it wants the court to 
interpret ambiguities in its statutes, it must document its 
intent—something the Legislature can only do through a 
robust process. 
Each year, statutory interpretation cases form the bulk of 
the New York State Court of Appeals’ calendar.138  These cases 
all ask the court to determine the applicability of a particular 
statute to a particular set of facts that have either been agreed 
to by the parties or resolved by the lower courts.  Usually the 
statute is unclear, meaning that the relevant text does not 
provide a clear answer to the question at hand.  Litigation over 
the meaning of a clear statute is far less likely, given that it is 
proscribed by the plain meaning rule, which for the most part 
obligates the court to apply clear text as written.139  The court 
has affirmed that ―[w]hen . . . a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, courts are obligated to construe the statute so as 
to give effect to the plain meaning of the words.‖140  As former-
Chief Judge Judith Kaye wrote, ―[u]nless a statute in some way 
contravenes the state or federal constitution, we are obliged to 
follow it—and of course we do.‖141 
 
138. See generally New York Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals 
Calendar, 
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/appeals/calpro/calendar.pl?calendar=default 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2010).  
139. See generally ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997).  
140. Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. 1999). 
141. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: 
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 26 (1995). 
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When a statute is unclear, on the other hand, courts must 
find meaning beyond its text.  Legislative history is a critical 
resource for courts tasked with determining legislative intent.  
Despite a generation of academic debate over the probative 
value of such history, it remains the touchstone of both federal 
and state court interpretive efforts.142  The New York courts 
have followed suit.  As the New York Court of Appeals opined 
regarding finding the meaning of an unclear statute, ―[o]ur 
preeminent responsibility in that endeavor is to search for and 
effectuate the Legislature’s purpose.  In this respect, legislative 
history and the events associated with and occasioning the 
passage of the particular statute are valuable guiding 
lights.‖143  Legislative history normally consists of the formally 
documented steps of the legislative process.  As Judge Patricia 
Wald has written about Congress, ―legislative history is the 
authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress.  
It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation, 
and it represents the way Congress communicates with the 
country at large.‖144  In Congress and most state legislatures, 
the legislative entities that generate most of this 
documentation are committees.145  Committees are the working 
arms of most legislative bodies, and their products—committee 
reports and transcripts of committee debates and hearings—
are the means by which legislatures inform most of their 
membership and the public on the purpose, meaning, and 
background of legislation.  Transcripts of floor debates 
similarly can provide guidance. 
 Omitted from any serious discussion of probative 
legislative history are executive signing statements.  These 
written statements, which usually accompany bills signed into 
law, contain the reasons the executive is signing the bill and 
often include the administration’s reading of particular 
provisions of the bill.  Such signing statements are normally 
not considered probative of legislative meaning.  They are post-
facto statements of the executive that have not received 
 
142. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139. 
143. Fumarelli v. Marsam Dev., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1988). 
144. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative 
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306-307 (1990). 
145. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139.  
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legislative consideration.146  For this reason, the court logically 
confines its exploration of legislative intent to documents 
produced by the Legislature itself. 
In New York, the typical documents that comprise 
legislative history do not exist.  As the Brennan Center has 
reported, committees are moribund and debate on the floor is 
almost nonexistent.147  As former-Chief Judge Kaye has noted 
in her discussions of New York lawmaking, ―[i]n New York . . . 
legislative history is relatively sparse.‖148  Often, the only 
record of intent accompanying a bill is a bill jacket created by 
the executive.  After a bill is presented to the Governor, it is 
common practice for ―the Counsel to the Governor to gather 
comments on the bill from executive agencies and groups 
affected by the legislation.‖149  With the bill, the comments are 
placed in a file, known as the bill jacket: 
 
In New York this bill jacket becomes the central 
repository of a bill’s history.  Sometimes a bill 
jacket will contain a letter or memorandum from 
a legislator or legislatively generated documents 
such as introductory memoranda. Basically 
though, almost all materials contained in bill 
jackets are executively generated post passage 
documents.150  
 
The dearth of legislative history originating from the 
legislature forces the New York courts to rely on these bill 
jackets for interpretation.  The Fumarelli decision is a typical 
example: ―The Bill Jacket materials include two memoranda 
presented for the Governor’s consideration, when he approved 
the bill to become law, that are also useful to the interpretive 
work of the courts.‖151  Of the two memos to which the court 
 
146. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 40 (―While the [executive] has the 
power to veto a bill and the legislature has the power to override the veto the 
legislature has no power to veto or override the executive’s signing message 
which can contain any statement the executive chooses to include.‖).  
147. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 19-20.  
148. Kaye, supra note 141, at 30.   
149. Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge 
Kaye and Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 113 (1999). 
150. Id. at 113-14.  
151. Fumarelli v. Marsam Dev. Inc., 703 N.E.2d 251, 254 (N.Y. 1988). 
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refers, one was submitted by the Office of the Attorney General 
and the other by the Office of the Secretary of State.152  After 
examining two years of Court of Appeals decisions, one study of 
New York statutory interpretation concluded, ―few made 
reference (and none exclusively) to what is apparently pre-
passage legislatively generated legislative history.‖153 
This reliance on executive-legislative history is problematic 
and another example of how legislative dysfunction in New 
York negatively affects the public.  It shifts the power to define 
legislative meaning or purpose from the legislature to the 
executive branch of government.  But from the judicial 
perspective this is a necessary measure to protect the integrity 
of the judiciary.  The lack of probative legislative history forces 
two choices upon the New York courts.  The court can either 
become a political body, debating and deciding what the law 
ought to be in each dispute, or create a façade of following the 
law by deferring to an outside source that has the trappings of 
legislative legitimacy.  The Court of Appeals has 
understandably chosen the second course.  As former-Chief 
Judge Kaye has observed: ―Indeed, on our court we especially 
strive for consensus in statutory interpretation cases as a 
matter of policy.‖154 
Our proposed approach—narrowly interpreting statutes 
unless legislative intent dictates otherwise—would allow the 
court to signal its preference for legislative history generated 
by the Legislature itself and may, over time, force the 
Legislature to begin producing documentary legislative history.  
The intended outcome of this approach is to pressure the 
legislature to better document its decision-making through 
public processes, particularly at the committee level.  As a 
robust legislative process, particularly at the committee level, 
is necessary to produce substantive and guiding legislative 
history documents, this approach could lead to the reform of 
the legislative process itself.  While it is true that many unclear 
statutes are the result of unforeseen or unforeseeable 
circumstances, or compromises to leave certain phrases 
unclear, a rich committee record can, and often does, provide 
 
152. Id.  
153. Lane, supra note 149, at 116.  
154. Kaye, supra note 141, at 23.  
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6
2010] ALBANY’S DYSFUNCTION 997 
clues to the enacting legislature’s intent or purpose.155  The 
court can then use such clues to determine the meaning of the 
statutory provision in the context of the particular case in 
question.  We predict that the adoption of a doctrine of narrow 
interpretation will motivate all participants in the legislative 
process—both inside and outside the Legislature—to make 
greater efforts to avoid a cookie-cutter approach to lawmaking 
in the interest of establishing a record of legislative intent, 
thereby forcing greater public consideration of legislation.  In 
other words, once the court’s doctrine of narrow interpretation 
becomes clear, it will be in the best interest of lobbyists and 
others advocating for the passage of a bill to ensure that their 
intent is documented in the legislative record and is available 
to a court that might be called upon to interpret a statute. 
 
E. Opening Closed Political Conferences   
 
 As the Brennan Center reports evidence, the fundamental 
problem with New York’s legislative process is the domination 
by majority leadership.156  Such domination requires both 
committees and chamber consideration to be moribund, but 
leaders need some forum for communicating with members.  
This is the purpose of the closed, unrecorded, political 
conferences, most importantly those held by the majority party, 
which are typically led by the chamber leader.  It is in these 
conferences—and only in these conferences—that bills are 
presented, discussed in earnest, and voted on.  Without a 
majority vote of the majority party, no bill goes to the floor for 
final consideration.  Conversely, virtually every bill that goes to 
the floor is passed.157  The conferences’ privacy is to cover the 
fact that the discussions concern the politics of bills and not 
their substance.  What else would explain the reasoning behind 
blocking public access to public business?158 
 
155. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 27-29. 
156. See generally 2004 REPORT, supra note 3; 2006 REPORT, supra note 
3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.   
157. Since the June 2009 coup weakened Democrats’ control of the 
chamber, six bills have failed in the Senate.  E-mail from Andrew Stengel, 
Senior Adviser for Government Reform, New York State Senate Majority, to 
Laura Seago, Research Associate, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 3, 2009, 
11:59 EST) (on file with the Brennan Center). 
158. For a general discussion of secrecy in government, see Eric Lane, 
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As noted above, this closed process is protected by statute.  
In 1985, after an appellate court determined that certain 
political caucuses in which the legislative business of a locality 
was conducted violated the state’s open meeting law,159 the 
New York Legislature enacted an amendment to the law to 
protect the privacy of its political conferences without regard to 
―the subject matter under discussion, including discussions of 
public business.‖160  About this provision, the New York 
Commission on Government Integrity wrote, ―[i]n our 
judgment, the public is entitled to make an informed decision 
about the quality of its representatives, and cannot do so if the 
significant deliberations of those representatives are held 
behind closed doors.‖161 
The use of party conferences as the exclusive venue for 
meaningful legislative discussion and voting removes any 
excuse for their appropriateness.  A plaintiff injured by a 
statute adopted in this fashion could challenge the due process 
constitutionality of the statute, tapping into the democratic 
rationales for both King and Campaign for Fiscal Equity.  
Additionally, both the plaintiff and the court could address the 
matter without treading into exclusively legislative territory.  
Such a ruling might force the legislature into a more open 
deliberative process. 
Neither of these approaches is intended as a substitute for 
a political remedy.  Even if the courts are willing to pursue 
either proposed judicial remedy—a far less likely prospect for 
the second approach than the first—there is no guarantee that 
either would serve as an adequate incentive for reform to a 
Legislature as entrenched in a pattern of inaction as New 
York’s.  The Legislature may choose to ignore a court applying 
our first remedy, and could reveal little meaningful 
deliberation even if it did open party conferences in response to 
a mandate from a court applying the second.  Ultimately, the 
 
Frederick A.O. Schwarz & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the President’s 
Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, GEO. MASON L. REV. 
(forthcoming).  
159. Sciolino v. Ryan, 440 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1981). 
160. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108 (McKinney 2008). 
161. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTIVE 
REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 328 
(Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).  For a full discussion of the case, changes, and 
criticisms, see MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17.  
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only force to which the Legislature can be guaranteed to 
respond is political. 
 
VI. The Political Process 
 
Given the liabilities of a judicial remedy, a political remedy 
is no doubt the most prudent in moving the Legislature toward 
procedural functionality.  The Brennan Center’s experience has 
also demonstrated that over time, such an approach can be 
fruitful. 
The Brennan Center’s 2004 report provided editorial 
boards, good government advocates, and reform-minded 
legislators with a clear and simple thesis: New York’s 
Legislature is the most dysfunctional in the nation, and it must 
reform itself.162  In 2005, the Brennan Center laid out twenty-
two concrete recommendations for procedural reform, and the 
groundswell of support for these reforms compelled both 
chambers to make modest changes to their rules—to great 
fanfare.163  The Center’s 2006 and 2008 reports confirmed the 
suspicion that these minor changes did little to solve the real 
problems plaguing New York’s legislative process, and they 
each renewed the call to adopt its full slate of recommended 
procedural reforms.164 
The low murmur begun by the Brennan Center’s efforts 
was amplified as the Senate Democrats seized upon reform as 
an issue on which they could distinguish themselves from the 
chamber’s Republican majority.  The Democrats adopted the 
rhetoric of this reform agenda in their successful effort to 
reclaim the chamber majority in 2008.165  Once in office, 
Democratic Majority Leader Malcolm Smith introduced modest 
changes to the rules, primarily focused on reducing restrictions 
on discharging bills out of committee, and formed the 
 
162. See generally 2004 REPORT, supra note 3.   
163. See Press Release, Office of Senate Majority Leader Joseph L. 
Bruno, Senate Passes Rules Changes and Reforms (Jan. 24, 2005) (on file with 
author); Press Release, New York State Assembly, Silver and Nesbitt Announce 
Bipartisan Agreement Reforming Assembly Rules (Jan. 6, 2005), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20050106/. 
164. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.  
165. See Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Capturing Senate, 
Democrats are Poised to Control Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at P15. 
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Temporary Committee on Rules and Administration Reform to 
review that chamber’s operations and make more sweeping 
proposals for reform.166  The chamber’s initial report in April 
2009 included some preliminary suggestions primarily focused 
on transparency and the promise that the committee would 
develop clear guidelines for committee reforms by the year’s 
end.167  In their June 2009 coup attempt, Senate Republicans 
attempted to pass new rules that included many of these 
suggestions alongside additional reforms.168 
An important victory came in July 2009 when, after weeks 
of infighting over control of the chamber during which each 
party struggled to position itself as the voice of government 
integrity and reform, the full Senate passed a rules resolution 
in a post-coup overnight session.169  This resolution adopted a 
significant number of the Brennan Center’s recommendations, 
some of which were originally codified in the Republicans’ June 
rules proposals.170  These reforms appear to end leadership 
control over moving bills to the floor, allow committee members 
to petition for committee hearings, and pledge that all 
legislative materials will be made publicly available on the 
internet.171  The resolution passed with the new rules also 
promised that the Temporary Committee on Rules and 
Administration Reform would revisit the issue of committees 
later in the year to make further reforms.172  As of this writing, 
this last promise has not been fulfilled. 
The fact that these reforms only came about as the result 
of a particularly brutal and drawn-out political battle that 
 
166. See Malcolm A. Smith’s Biography – New York State Senate, 
http://www.nysenate.gov/senator/malcolm-smith/bio (last visited Feb. 24, 
2010).  
167. See generally DAVID J. VALESKY & JOHN J. BONACIC, N.Y. STATE 
SENATE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE ON RULES AND 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM (2009), available at 
http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/RulesReformx1a_0.pdf. 
168. Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Albany G.O.P. Wrests Control of 
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1.  
169. Posting of Andrew Stengel to New York State Senate Blog, Senate 
Passes Historic Rules Resolution Sponsored by Smith/Valesky, 
http://www.nysenate.gov/blogs/2009/jul/16/senate-passes-historic-rules-
resolution-sponsored-smithvalesky (July 16, 2009). 
170. S. Res. 2844, 2009 Leg. (N.Y. 2009).  
171. See id. 
172. Id. 
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never had reform as its primary goal may actually hold 
promise for future prospects for reform efforts driven by the 
Legislature itself.  The July 2009 coup was the result of the 
Legislature’s own dysfunction, specifically the opacity of the 
budget process and the dissatisfaction of the new minority 
party with the limited privileges granted to its members in the 
leadership-dominated chamber.  Continued legislative 
dysfunction will no doubt breed similar dissatisfaction which 
will, in all likelihood, lead to similar skirmishes in the future.  
It is possible that these moments of chaos offer the most hope 
for reform advocates; anyone seeking to quell a rising tide of 
anger amongst rank-and-file members or to establish the 
majority party’s credibility would do well to adopt reforms that 
make the legislative chamber and the lawmaking process more 
open, accountable, and deliberative. 
It is our hope that the Senate’s July reforms have put into 
motion a larger movement in the direction of legislative 
legitimacy in New York.  The dust generated by the June 2009 
coup continues to settle, and the chamber’s leadership must 
ensure that last year’s reforms will be allowed to take effect.  
Its new rules must be put to use by members and advocates; 
while these rules reforms enable a robust lawmaking process, 
they alone do not constitute it.  The Senate must also be held 
accountable for its promise to enact further reforms with 
respect to the committee process.  And the Assembly, now by 
far the less procedurally robust chamber, must be pressured to 
follow suit.  The pressure necessary to make these reforms a 
reality must come from within the Legislature, from advocates, 
and from the public at large.  Voter discontent—another form 
of chaos that catalyzes change—may also serve to push the 
legislature toward reform in the future. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
On all three metrics—representativeness, accessibility, 
and deliberativeness—New York fails the legislative legitimacy 
test.  New York’s Legislature, with its leader-dominated 
structure that subverts the committee process and obscures 
public business from view, remains the most dysfunctional in 
the nation.  It follows, then, that legislative due process, which 
dictates ―that government is not to take life, liberty, or property 
37
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under color of laws that were not made according to a 
legitimate law-making process‖173 is also violated in New York. 
Our aversion to a strong judicial remedy is not born out of 
doubt that New York’s situation is adequately dire to justify a 
dramatic intervention.  We counsel judicial prudence out of a 
desire to avoid inadvertently undermining one fundamental 
principle of American government, the separation of powers, in 
the process of upholding another, legislative legitimacy.  The 
first judicial remedy that we do endorse—narrowly 
interpreting all statutes not accompanied by legislative 
history—is also derived from respect for government 
institutions and the separation of powers.  In the absence of 
legislative history generated from the Legislature itself, the 
court is forced to tread into the murky territory of over-
deference to the executive when interpreting unclear statutes.  
Narrow interpretations prevent the court from overstepping its 
bounds and underscore the necessity of legislative history, 
bolstering the integrity of the court.  Our second proposed 
remedy—a due process claim brought by an individual injured 
by a statute deliberated only in a closed-door party 
conference—also has, at its core, the intent of preserving the 
integrity of state government, and does so without threatening 
encroachment by the court on the wholly internal affairs of the 
Legislature. 
While the judicial remedies we propose have value in their 
own right, New York’s especially obstinate Legislature may 
need more than the gentle nudge offered by these solutions to 
move toward reform.  The political process is no doubt a 
stronger tool in any effort to imbue New York’s lawmaking 
process with legitimacy because it relies on the relationships, 
procedures, and incentives that are native to the Legislature 
itself.  We have already seen some progress on this front. 
The month long halt of Senate activity in June 2009 and 
the Legislature’s failure to pass a deficit reduction plan 
sufficient to close the state’s budget gap a few months later 
highlighted the fact that New York state government is in 
crisis.  While the legislature has a host of substantive problems 
to address, they can only be adequately treated through a 
legitimate process.  The court would be more than justified in 
 
173. Linde, supra note 9, at 239. 
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taking prudent and limited action to attempt to pressure the 
Legislature to remedy itself.  Action from the public and the 
Legislature itself is more than justified—it is long overdue. 
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